We examine the extent of the exogeneity of the money supply using monthly data spanning from 1964.04 to 1986.02. The tests applied investigated the plausibility of classical hypotheses. We employed Kalman Filter procedures, Johansen cointegration procedures, and the bootstrap approach. We argued that the real rate of interest did cause, in the Granger sense, the bond stock supporting the claim that the monetary authority was able to perform indirect monetary control through open market transactions. The results show that seigniorage collection was a white noise and econometrically independent from the inflation rate. Money creation and the inflation rate were cointegrated. We found that money growth was weakly exogenous for the parameter of interest in the conditional model of inflation, but the reverse is not true for inflation. Moreover, Granger's causal relation between them was unidirectional from money to inflation. Therefore, money growth was strongly exogenous concerning the inflation rate. These empirical findings differ greatly from many previous results. Our main contribution is having demonstrated that the monetary supply was exogenous with respect to the inflation rate and that the monetary authority had enough independence to execute an active monetary policy. Os testes indicaram que a expansão monetária era fracamente exógena para os parâmetros de interesse no modelo condicional da inflação, mas o inverso não é válido para a taxa de inflação. Ademais, a relação de causalidade de Granger entre essas variáveis era unidirecional, da expansão monetária para a inflação. Portanto, o crescimento monetário era fortemente exógeno no que concerne à taxa de inflação. Esses resultados são inteiramente divergentes de estudos anteriores. Nossa principal contribuição é ter demonstrado que a oferta monetária era exógena com respeito à taxa de inflação e que a autoridade monetária tinha independência suficiente para executar uma política monetária ativa.
respect to both the 'model in question' and the inflation rate (for a detailed description of the monetary policy of the period, see Simonsen, 1985 and Cerqueira, 2007a) .
We intend to support this assumption with three arguments. First, the monetary authority conducted the open market policy increasing the real interest rate in order to stimulate the demand for bonds. Second, even if during part of this period the seigniorage collection remained constant as a share of GDP, the government succeeded in keeping its fraction of revenues by reducing the monetary base multiplier 1 . Moreover, the seigniorage-GDP ratio followed a white noise process and was therefore independent of the inflation rate. Third, the existing causality between money growth and inflation was unidirectional from the former to the latter.
Many Brazilian economists thought the money supply was passive during most of the period from 1964. 04-1986.02 . One likely rationale supporting this belief is the hypothesis of rational expectations. If the demand function for real balances follows Cagan's form, the solution for the current inflation is a function of the expected money creation rate, excluding the possibility of rational explosive bubbles. In this case, money supply is endogenous.
An alternative argument is based on Sargent and Wallace's (1973) scheme derived from Cagan's model under the hypotheses of adaptive expectations and a monetary rule, which depend on past inflation rates. This is a model in which the adaptive mechanism is rational. In Sargent & Wallace's model, the best way to forecast the subsequent rates of money creation is by extrapolating lagged rates of inflation. This in turn implies that inflation itself is best forecast by extrapolating past inflation rates. So both money creation and inflation are best forecast by extrapolating current and lagged rates of inflation. Lagged rates of money creation add nothing to forecasts made in this way. In this model, past values of inflation influence money creation but the opposite is not true; thus, money supply is passive.
An essential element in this argument is the hypothesized feedback that occurs from expected inflation to money creation. This feedback emerges due to the government's attempt to finance a roughly constant rate of operational deficit by money creation. In this sense, this is also a description of Bruno and Fischer's (1990) version of Cagan's model, in which monetary expansion is endogenously determined by expected inflation, given a constant level of seigniorage.
However, if monetary expansion follows a purely autoregressive process or a white noise process, then under adaptive expectations monetary expansion and money supply are exogenous regarding the inflation rate. In this system, money creation influences current and subsequent inflation rates; but given lagged rates of money creation, past inflation rates exert no influence on money creation. The system is one in which money creation causes inflation, in Granger's sense, whereas inflation does not cause money creation. In this model adaptive expectations are not rational, feedback occurs from the expected inflation to the current inflation rate, emerging from an autonomous increase in monetary expansion. Therefore, under adaptive expectations the money supply passivity is a consequence of the monetary rule followed by the monetary authority.
Brazil's long experience with high inflation rates gave rise to an efficient indexation system that protected agents from the effects of inflation. Even if the indexation rules did not fairly contemplate the agents, one cannot deny that such rules prevented the ever-rising inflation from degenerating into public panic, speculative run and an open hyperinflation process.
Furthermore, the indexation rules were developed slowly throughout the seventies and eighties simultaneously with an increasing inflation rate. Price system inflexibility was then introduced gradually, which augmented inflation inertia but did not destroy the inflationary memory. Thus, as the economy's degree of indexation rose, the inflation rate became inertial, i.e., its present values began to depend on its past ones. These arguments supposedly explain why the agents had adaptive expectations about the inflation in the period. Therefore, Brazil's experience over the period did not provide evidence of expectations being formed rationally. One can therefore argue that the monetary policy followed a rule independent of the inflation rate. This assertion is tested in section 3.
The assumption of endogenous money growth cannot be supported by empirical evidence.
Surprisingly, some Brazilian authors found a unidirectional relation between inflation and money creation; see the empirical studies of Marques (1983 ), Triches (1992 , Pastore (1994 Pastore ( /1995 Pastore ( , 1997 .
We can suppose that their results were obtained by using lower frequency data (quarterly Thus, one could assume that the real interest rates were strictly exogenous as to the demand for bonds; see Sargent (1987) . It can thus be concluded that the monetary authority altered the real interest rates to cause changes in the demand for bonds. Besides, since the public debt is a nonmonetary liability, this mechanism operated as an instrument to control the money supply.
Finally, the demand for bonds was elastic to the real interest rates, and the overnight interest rates were high enough to encourage bond sales. These empirical facts suggest an active behavior of the monetary authority instead of a passive monetary policy and an endogenous money supply.
Seigniorage and inflation
Let us 
) (
where M is nominal money demand, P is index price, Y the GDP, c is a constant which captures nominal shocks and financial innovation changes, π e is the expected inflation rate, α is the semielasticity of money demand with regard to the expected inflation, and β is the opposite of inflationary memory (the bigger β is, the smaller the effect of past inflation on present inflation expectations). We assume a constant growth rate and a constant real interest rate. For a given level of exogenous money growth µ, the seigniorage flow is given by:
By making some operations we get to the expected inflation rate dynamics equation: 
The monetary expansion rate increases with the expected level of inflation and thus is passive. So a reduction in the constant term c caused by a financial innovation shifts down the reaction curve that increases the monetary expansion and the inflation rate -in the (π e ,µ) mapping −, which implies increases in monetary expansion and inflation expectations.
The postulation of a reaction curve as (5) and the existence of empirical evidence that the monetary authority had been following it are two different things. Such behavior implies a passive a money supply caused, in Granger's sense, by lagged inflation rates, a popular hypothesis among Brazilian economists. This claim tends to be accepted due to the empirical evidence in Pastore (1994 Pastore ( /1995 Pastore ( , 1997 , whose results show that money growth is caused by inflation, but the opposite is not true. Therefore the author concludes that the money supply was predominantly passive.
Intuition suggests that the Central Bank's repurchase agreements tended to make money supply endogenous. However, some reflection shows that the former facilitates the latter, though does not determine it. If the inflation rates grow due to a negative supply shock and the Central Bank's goal was to keep the real interest rate constant, the Bank would automatically buy bonds through repurchase agreements, sanctioning the price increase with a larger monetary base stock.
The money supply was made endogenous or caused by the Central Bank's rule to fix the real interest rate, and was but was facilitated -or accelerated -by the repurchase agreements, not due to the latter per se. Money endogeneity runs independently of the monetary regime provided that the Central Bank keeps the real interest rate constant 4 .
Notwithstanding, if the Central Bank allows the real interest rate's floating to sell bonds, such causality will be eliminated or reduced. In the Brazilian monetary regime, selling bonds would cause a simultaneous increase in the nominal and real interest rates, whereas in a conventional monetary regime the increase of interest rates would cause a growth of bond demand, implying a more instantaneous and precise control of monetary stock than in our case. Cerqueira (2006) showed that the real interest rates floating not only appeared to be significant in the public bonds demand, but also caused the public debt. These empirical results contradict Pastore's evidence, making us review his empirical analysis on the causality between the inflation rate and money growth. We shall start by analyzing the behavior of the seigniorage/GDP ratio series. In 1976, the monthly inflation rate went above 3% and from 1976.1 to 1988.4 the monetary base growth as GDP fraction did no present any significant change. We thus admit that from this level the inflation acceleration would not have any impact over government revenue with issuance base. Then the primary money growth can be taken as relatively constant and independent from the inflation rate. This leads us to presume that seigniorage can be described as an erratic process similar to a white noise; see figure 1. This hypothesis is based on the increasing cost of holding money and on the process of fiat money replacement by other financial assets, which took place after 1976.
The seigniorage/GDP series has a quarterly frequency, as does the GDP. The real GDP is the one estimated in Cerqueira (2007c) , by Kalman filter with benchmarking adjustment; see Durbin and Koopman (2004) . Since the seigniorage/GDP shows seasonality and some outliers, we decided to extract these components first. We estimated a stationary structural model using Kalman filter procedures with an AR (1) sample mean. Nor can we reject the hypothesis that the inflation rate coefficient is nonsignificant; and that both R 2 and residuals behave according to expectations. The above results confirm the hypothesis that from 1976.1 to 1988.4 the ratio seigniorage/GDP followed a white noise statistic process ~ (0.0170; 0.0052). This means that, even having a finite average, its behavior could not be predicted due to the series' lack of memory. Thus, seigniorage collection behaved as a random shock. It did not show any relation with the contraction of money holdings or with the rise of the inflation rate. It can, therefore, be taken as independent from the inflation rate, which did not alter in any way this governmentfinancing source. Such conclusion provides empirical support to the hypothesis that even if the monetary authority was attempting to finance a roughly constant rate of public deficit by money creation, the seigniorage collection did not follow a path consistent with the endogenous money supply.
We claim this is likely to be related to the policy of reducing the base multiplier. This policy contributed to maintain the effectiveness of inflationary tax collection, reinforcing the claim of an exogenous monetary policy. In such a case, money supply issuing influences current and future inflation rates, but past inflation values do not influence money supply 7 . The system is such that money creation causes inflation, though not the other way round. In this system, Cagan's adaptive scheme is not rational.
From 1976 to 1985 a host of financial innovations contracted the monetary demand that restricted seigniorage collection. However, the policy to reduce the monetary base multiplier counterbalanced this effect (Figure 1 ) 8 . Moreover, the observed inflation and monetary rates, while increasing, were very distant from the unstable levels, thus far from a hyperinflationary disequilibrium; see Cerqueira (2006) . We thus assert that a fixed rate of public deficit permanently funded by money creation supported the sustainability of the public debt, as the exogeneity of money supply was preserved. This suggests the existence of a steady state public deficit financed by seigniorage, as in Cagan's adaptative model; see details in Cerqueira (2007b) .
To complete the exogeneity hypothesis' money supply proof, it must be shown that money growth in Granger's sense caused the inflation rate, but inflation did not cause money growth (see Sargent and Wallace, 1993) . 
Money supply exogeneity
The study comprises the 1964.04-1986.02 period. The former marks the end of a period of monetary imbalance and the beginning of a vigorous and successful plan to stabilize inflation, based on harsh fiscal and monetary policies. The period truncation is for 1986.02 due to a radical change in the inflation stabilization policy -which took place in 1986.03 -which brought about wage and price freezing and an accommodative monetary policy. The implication was acceleration and permanent change in inflation dynamics, which supposedly changed the rules of inflation expectation formation. Thus, we underline that the results in this paper refer only to the period between 1964.04 and 1986.02.
When looking for a causal relation, the first step is determining the series series' integration order, and then testing the existence of a cointegration relation between them. If so, it is tested whether any of the variables can be regarded as weakly exogenous with a given interest parameter. Ultimately, causality tests in Granger's sense are carried out. As the series present many outliers and their presence makes it difficult to implement cointegration tests (see Cerqueira, 2006) , we chose to have the series go through the previous treatment by using univariate structural models with Kalman filtering procedures. We also decided to seasonally adjust the series by putting aside the respective stochastic seasonal component identified by the same approach. Both procedures imply causing the VAR to be parsimonious, especially when working with monthly data. The adjusted (ADJ) and observed (OBS) series are shown in Figure 2 in monthly frequency. Unit root tests are reported in Appendix A. Inflation series show no ambiguities I(1), the money supply series is also taken as I(1).
The next step is finding a cointegration relation between the variables. We chose Johansen's (1991) co-integration procedure test. Choosing the VAR lag length and the deterministic components is crucial for the test results. We decided to specify the VAR according to the recommendation by Gonzalo (1994) , Dolado and Lütkepohl (1996) , Giles & Mirza (1998) and Lütkepohl and Saikkonen (1999) . Thus we searched for a stable VAR -which led to the introduction of a linear trend term -whose residuals assessed by multivariate portmanteau (with minimal lag adjusted by the degrees of freedom and T/4) and Breusch-Godfrey type tests (1 to 12 lags) did not carry any serial correlation. This made us reach 10 as the minimal lag number. On the other hand, an overfitting model has little efficiency loss, whereas consistency is lost if the lag length is too small. Wald test's power loss is small when extra lags are added, in case the true VAR order is large and the system dimension small. Moreover, when unidirectional causality is suspected, overfitting methods cause less distortion with often little or no power loss if compared to the pre-testing procedures; see Giles and Mirza (1998) . For those reasons, we chose to work with an overfitted VAR(11). Although the series are treated as outliers, analysis of the unrestricted VAR residualswithout imposition of cointegration relation -suggests the presence of ARCH elements and nonGaussian residuals 9 . The causes for such violations derive fundamentally from the inflation rate.
These are not a blow for the cointegration relation since asymptotic properties of Johansen's procedure exclusively depend on IID error hypothesis. So the normality hypothesis is thus not vital for conclusions -although the ARCH effect might be; see Johansen (1995) .
We therefore rejected the null hypothesis that there is no cointegration at 1% significance level according to the trace statistics and at 1.8% with the maximum eigenvalue statistics 10 Inspection of residuals after imposing all the above restrictions enhances the residual stochastic properties, closer to being Gaussian. As in the non-restricted model (not reported), some hypothesis violations can be traced to the residuals of the inflation equation. There are also four roots in the companion matrix around 0.90. This shows that system stability is far from ideal, although it is not explosive. On the other hand, the multivariate diagnostic tests show that our choice of 11 lags for the VAR was appropriate. Firstly because the residuals have no serial correlation, and secondly because choosing a more parsimonious VAR would have led to the estimation of misspecified VECM model with autocorrelated residuals (these results are not reported in the paper, see Cerqueira, 2007b) . Granger's direct test specification is taken from the VECM estimates -with 11 lags − and the restriction given by (1,-1,#,#). Residuals of the money creation equation are approximately NIID, whereas residuals of the inflation equation are not. We thus used a parametrical bootstrap 13 to access the specific distribution of Wald (F) and likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics. As one can observe, the conclusions hold. Causality test results show that money growth causes inflation, whereas the inflation rate fails to cause money growth. There is no type of feedback from inflation to currency. This result contrasts with Cerqueira (2006) . This is illustrated by the impulse-response functions 14 ( Figure 3 ) estimated with generalized impulse. This procedure constructs an orthogonal set of innovations that does not depend on the VAR ordering 15 ; see Pesaran and Shin (1998) .
The one standard shock in money growth causes a period of fluctuations in this series until it achieves its new steady state level, around 0.56 percentage points (hypothesis accepted with p-value = 0.8379) above its initial level. Indeed, beyond period 27, the impulse functions are statistically different from zero, with p-value around 0%, which backs this claim. The impulse in monetary expansion leads to a permanent increase in the inflation rate, but an inflationary shock does not have any meaningful effect on money growth. The peak shown in the seventh period is not significant with p-value 0.8544, and the average impact is close to zero throughout the period.
On the other hand, a monetary shock has permanent impact on the inflation rate, close to 0.55 percentage points. When innovations are considered, either in inflation rate or in money growth, 84% of the final variation in inflation rate is caused by monetary shock. This resultattained with the inflation rate prediction error variance decomposition -shows a feedback effect (around 16%) on the inflation rate due to inflationary expectations. We can conclude that the existing persistence in inflation was mainly due to monetary causes, not disturbances on the real side of the economy or to the price indexation system. As for the inflation rate from 1964.04 to 1986.02, there is enough evidence to validate the hypothesis that money growth is strongly exogenous. Evidence supports the claim that causality is unidirectional and moves from money expansion to inflation 16 . This means that money supply was not passive and was strictly econometrically exogenous (Sims, 1972) with respect to determining prices 17 . Besides, this strongly indicates that the monetary authority did not, in the period, follow as a monetary rule a reaction curve as the one described in equation (5) 18 . Lastly, once the money supply was exogenous, Sargent and Wallace's (1973) model reveals that the inflation expectation from 1964.04 to 1986.02 followed Cagan's adaptive scheme. show that the monetary expansion caused the inflation rate in Granger's sense, and the former was weakly exogenous compared with the latter. This was possible because the monetary authority chose to reduce the base multiplier in order to keep its proportion of seigniorage collection. Therefore, even with (i) a permanent deficit with the seigniorage playing a crucial role in balancing the public accounts, and (ii) a host of financial innovations that led to the contraction of the money demand, the money supply remained exogenous with respect to the inflation rate. Therefore, Brazilian inflation followed an ever-increasing path without setting off a hyperinflationary process.
Conclusions
We may conclude that money creation influences current and future inflation rates, but, given lagged rates of money creation, past inflation rates exert no influence on money creation. This is an indication that Cagan's rational adaptive schemes are not adequate for the Brazilian economy and that the rule followed by economic agents to form expectations about inflation was adaptive. That is a normative conclusion from the Sargent-Wallace (1973) paper based on Cagan's. This contrasts sharply with an existing tradition among Brazilian economists, who assume that the monetary policy was completely passive during the 1970s and 1980s.
Indeed, our results reveal that the monetary policy was executed in an independent way, that is, the rule guiding monetary execution was taken exogenously with regard to the considered model and the inflation rate. Therefore, we postulate that the monetary authority chose to finance a roughly fixed rate of public deficit by issuing money. This explains the intermittent monetary expansion and the inflation rate. Such policy generated a vicious cycle: by exacerbating the inflation expectations, it introduced a feedback in the inflation growth. In addition, it caused the uninterrupted growth of the debt-service payments and, consequently, the continuous increase of the nominal public deficit.
Rejecting the causality from prices to money does not mean to propose there was a rigid monetary control. This depends on the monetary regime. In a regime whose monetary authority is independent, it is possible to fulfill almost any target of money stock. Compelled by public deficit, the monetary authority may refuse to buy public bonds in the open market and then impose upon the fiscal authority the cost of increasing the real interest rate through the primary auctions. In the Brazilian regime, this was a task for the Central Bank. It was enough that the real interest rate was restricted to float within a given range to determine the deficit monetization through repurchase agreements. In this regime, monetary control was indirect, and the instruments were less efficient but enough to manage an exogenous money supply from inflation variations. Perhaps these are somewhat old monetarist ideas, but we cannot deny they stamped their mark on the data. For further studies we suggest to apply the approach presented in the Table 1a reports the results of unit root tests to the series in levels and in first difference with monthly frequency. Besides the traditional ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) and PP (Phillips-Perron) tests we also report their well-known modifications, namely: DF-GLS (DickeyFuller test with GLS Detrending), ERS-PO (Elliot et al., 2004 point optimal test) and Ng-Perron (NG and Perron test); see Maddala and Kim (2002) . Note: ( †) represents rejection of a unit root at the 10% significance level; ( ‡) at 5% significance; (*) rejection at 1%; no symbol means acceptation of the null hypothesis at 10%. Table 1b shows the cointegration tests with critical values at 1% level and the respective p-values; see Mackinnon et al. (1999) . 
APPENDIX B Cointegration test

COINTEGRATION RESTRICTION TEST
RESTRICTION: (1,-1,#,#) χ 2 (1) = 0.0459; P-VALUE = 0.8309
Note: The symbol # means the parameter is unrestricted. The estimated eigenvalues are 0.0813 and 0.0503.
In Table 2b , we present the weak-exogeneity test using two different statistics. The first tests the joint hypothesis that the cointegrating vector is (1,-1,#,#) and the adjustment coefficients are respectively (0,α) and (α,0). The second, in brackets, uses the estimated cointegrated vector reported in Table B1 and these two adjustment coefficients. , where P is the price index and π the inflation rate. This means that the government collects 1/k of the produced inflation tax by the real money balances. The difference (1-1/k) represents the inflationary transfer from the private sector to the bank system.
